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“If the right to gather, to speak out, is to mean anything, then
we must also have the right to do so in air we can breathe.”
- Anna Feigenbaum1
ABSTRACT:
At a pivotal moment in the relationship between law enforcement
and the global public, this Note recalls the principle that impunity for
excessive use of force by the police should never be tolerated.2 Amid the
growing calls for police reform and bans on the use of tear gas on
protesters, this Note proposes a solution to balance the needs of law
enforcement officers with the interests of the public to exercise the right to
protest—an essential form of participation in public affairs. It analyzes
current international approaches to regulating the use of riot control
agents, including tear gas, and argues for the addition of an optional
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protocol to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the foremost arms control
treaty, to effect this balance on a global scale. By following such an
approach, the optional protocol will meet the needs of the many involved
in protests and law enforcement and improve public discourse and safety.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States and around the world, protests bear
witness to scenes of repression, dispersal, and limitation of the
exercise of the right to expression and to gather in dissent in the
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public sphere.3 According to some commentators, this repression
is born from a government fear that citizen mobilization disrupts
the public order and threatens the stability of democratic
institutions.4 In response, governments around the world deploy
chemical weapons in the form of Riot Control Agents (“RCAs”),
or tear gas,5 against protesters, often to quell dissent.6 Tear gas
was designed to torment combatants, and it now turns public
assemblies into toxic spaces, taking away what is often the last
communication channel some individuals have left to express
their needs.7 In the early history of tear gas, countries reacted to
the suffering that RCAs and other chemical weapons caused in
war with a long and continuous process of limiting and
delegitimizing their use in armed conflict.8 The time has come to
limit and delegitimize the use of these weapons of war in peace as
well.
The world has seen substantial growth in the use of RCAs to
disperse peaceful protesters.9 Recent protest movements globally

3. In the United States, the amount of tear gas used against protesters correlates
with the number of demonstrations happening in the country. Law enforcement
deployed a significant amount during the labor movement protests of the 1920’s and
30’s, the Civil Rights era, and during protests against the Vietnam War. It has now
reappeared as millions of people protest police brutality after the police killings of
George Floyd and Breonna Taylor, among others. See Loren Grush, Why Police Officers
Embraced a Banned Weapon of War, VERGE (Aug. 31, 2020, 9:10 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/21396099/tear-gas-protests-police-weapon-warfare-historycrowd-control [https://perma.cc/7MNT-PG9Y].
4. See Edison Lanza (Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights), Protest and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II
CIDH/RELE/INF.22/19, at 1 (2019).
5. “Tear gas” is an umbrella term which refers to crowd control chemicals, either
synthetic or derived from chili peppers, which cause excruciating pain and respiratory
distress in people exposed to them. Law enforcement officials sometimes refer to the
substances they use as “chemical irritants,” “chemical agents,” or “pepper balls,”
however, these distinctions are irrelevant to those who study and monitor tear gas. These
experts consider all such compounds as tear gas. See K.K. Rebecca Lai et al., Here Are the
100 U.S. Cities Where Protesters Were Tear-Gassed, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/16/us/george-floyd-protests-policetear-gas.html [https://perma.cc/R68P-YTBB].
6. See Micol Seigel, On the Critique of Paramilitarism, 12 GLOB. S. 166, 168 (2018).
7. FEIGENBAUM, supra note 1, at 182.
8. See Sean P. Giovanello, Riot Control Agents and Chemical Weapons Arms Control in
the United States, 5 J. STRATEGIC SEC. 1, 5 (2012).
9. See Ariela Levy & Patrick Wilcken, End the Abuse of Tear Gas for the Sake of Peaceful
INT’L
(June
12,
2020),
Protesters,
AMNESTY
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/end-the-abuse-of-tear-gas-for-the-
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have had unprecedented stamina, including racial justice protests
in the United States,10 yellow vest protests in France,11 and
protests in Hong Kong over extradition to mainland China.12
Protests, largely peaceful,13 have become international in nature,
with messages and tactics spreading among protest movements
and among the law enforcement agents they encounter.14
Through these protests, people are repeatedly exposed to RCAs,
which are considered chemical weapons under international
law.15 Although the use of these chemical weapons by law
enforcement is legal under the Chemical Weapons Convention,16
recent protests demonstrate that the distinction between the legal
use of RCAs in peacetime and their outlawed use in armed
conflicts is no longer justified.
This Note advocates for the end of the use of tear gas against
peaceful protesters. It argues that although RCAs can serve a
necessary purpose in law enforcement, their use should be so
sake-of-peaceful-protesters-in-hong-kong-the-usa-and-everywhere-else/
[https://perma.cc/4U28-W9ZJ].
10. See Adam Serwer, What Black Lives Matters Has Accomplished, ATLANTIC (Oct.
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/10/the-nextreconstruction/615475/ [https://perma.cc/G2A6-4MTF].
11. See Reuters in Paris, French Police Use Teargas at Gilets Jaunes Protest in Paris,
(Sept.
12,
2020),
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/12/french-police-use-teargas-at-giletjaunes-protest-in-paris [https://perma.cc/8E9G-PRGL].
12. See K.K. Rebecca Lai & Austin Ramzy, 1,800 Rounds of Tear Gas: Was the Hong
TIMES
(Aug.
18,
2019),
Kong
Police
Response
Appropriate?,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/18/world/asia/hong-kong-teargas.html [https://perma.cc/9PTW-A5S5].
13. See, e.g., ARMED CONFLICT LOCATION & EVENT DATA PROJECT,
DEMONSTRATIONS & POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: NEW DATA FOR SUMMER 2020
5
(2020),
https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/ACLED_USDataReview_Sum2020_SeptWebPDF_HiRes.pdf
. [https://perma.cc/RPV9-KZ5K].
14. See Mary Hui, Hong Kong is Exporting its Protest Techniques Around the World,
QUARTZ (Oct. 16, 2019), https://qz.com/1728078/be-water-catalonia-protesters-learnfrom-hong-kong/ [https://perma.cc/ADW5-RUC4]; see also Fan Lingzhi & Liu Caiyu,
HK Rioters Share Protest Tips Amid US Protest, GLOB. TIMES (June 1, 2020),
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1190144.shtml [https://perma.cc/6KF2-5QEV].
15. See Lai et al., supra note 5.
16. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction art. 2, ¶ 9(d), Sept.
3, 1992, T.I.A.S. 97-525, [hereinafter Chemical Weapons Convention]. The convention
broadly controls the use of RCAs, among other chemical weapons, in warfare, but it
allows for RCA use in law enforcement against civilians. The Convention has 193 state
parties. Id.
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limited and so regulated that they would be used rarely, if at all.
The United States and the global community should act in
accordance with overwhelming and growing public opinion again
and curtail the use of RCAs, this time against protesters. Part II
discusses the development of RCAs and their contemporary use
and abuse. Armed forces initially developed RCAs for combat, but
once public opinion had turned against their use in war,17
government proponents in the United States pushed for their use
on civilians in part to keep their jobs and in part to suppress
public dissent. Part III discusses the international law governing
the use of RCAs. While there are some measures that control the
use of RCAs, they are largely ineffective against the widespread
and growing use of RCAs around the world. Part IV discusses and
proposes changes to the legal regime controlling RCAs to
improve their use. An improved legal regime acknowledges the
importance of RCAs to legitimate law enforcement uses while
insisting on a better way forward.
II. TEAR GAS USE ON PROTESTERS
Tear gas forces people to flee from the area where gas was
dispersed. For most people, the gas irritates eyes, skin, and lungs
without causing serious, long-term injuries.18 Tear gas allows law
enforcement to maintain order without causing lasting harm, and
commercial tear gas promoters advertise it as a “more humane
way to disperse unruly crowds” because encounters with the gas
are typically non-lethal.19 Given this comparatively minimal
lethality, protesters who encounter tear gas are meant to be
thankful that they are not being shot with live ammunition
instead.20
Proponents recommend tear gas for defensive use against
crowds, but the vast majority of tear gas use is offensive, with users
dispersing it to move protesters out of an area by deploying the
gas in bulk.21 Such use can have grave and unacceptable
consequences. When law enforcement misuses tear gas, it can
17. Daniel P. Jones, From Military to Civilian Technology: The Introduction of Tear Gas
for Civil Riot Control, 19 TECH. & CULTURE 151, 164 (1978).
18. Lai et al., supra note 5.
19. Grush, supra note 3.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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cause debilitating injuries.22 Prolonged exposure or high doses
can lead to permanent vision damage, asthma, and other longterm injuries, and improper deployment can cause canister
strikes which injure victims.23 Research shows that tear gas and
other purportedly non-lethal weapons that law enforcement use
can sometimes lead to serious injury and death.24 Additionally,
because tear gas by its very nature is indiscriminate, it is hard for
law enforcement to limit its impact to the intended target.25 Some
experts assert that the use of escalated force by law enforcement,
including tear gas, serves to increase violence and injuries.26
A. Development of Tear Gas
The practice of using tear gas to impair opponents, military
and later civilian, developed internationally.27 Although the
chemical agent’s tear-producing properties had been noticed for
several decades prior to World War I (“WWI”), its use is
commonly associated with the chemical warfare of that period.28
A systematic study of tear-producing agents occurred during
WWI, and forces on both sides of the conflict developed effective
means of dispersing the agent, as well as other more toxic gases.29
Tear gas and toxic gases, including mustard and chlorine gases,
accompanied most land operations in WWI.30
The important role of tear gas in WWI stems in part from the
fact that it was the first gas used in the armed conflict. Tear gas
22. Lai et al., supra note 5.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.; see Mike Baker, Corrosive Effects of Tear Gas Could Intensify Coronavirus
Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/03/us/teargas-risks-protests-coronavirus.html [ https://perma.cc/EUB2-64SU].
27. See Jones, supra note 17, at 151-54. The Americans, French, and Germans all
experimented with poisonous gases during WWI and developed tear gas as a way to force
opponents out of their trenches and into open fields where they could be killed. Grush,
supra note 3.
28. See Jones, supra note 17, at 152. Available evidence suggests that the French
military introduced tear gas into WWI. Paris law enforcement used cartridges containing
a tear-producing agent even before the war, and the French military used similar
dispersal means as early as August 1914, which was before the first chorine gas attack of
WWI.
29. Id.
30. Vladimír Pitchmann, Overall View of Chemical and Biochemical Weapons, 6 TOXINS
1761, 1763 (2014).
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also played a tactical role in forcing opposing armies to wear gas
masks, which was known to diminish soldiers’ efficacy.31 The end
of WWI saw intense public backlash against the use of chemical
weapons, particularly against toxic weapons. Chemical weapons
sidelined about one million soldiers, of which about ten percent
died.32 The public saw these weapons as inhumane. Not only did
they kill troops, the weapons worsened troops’ privations,
amplified the lethality of conventional weapons, and caused
severe psychological ailments.33
Following the backlash against chemical warfare, interested
parties in the US Army Bureau of Mines and Research Division of
the Chemical Warfare Service (“CWS”), the agency that first
developed tear gas for the United States, were responsible for its
repurposing for law enforcement uses.34 Some CWS employees,
facing the closing of their department, started tear gas
companies.35 Others worked as intermediaries to transfer the gas
to private companies, as the CWS could no longer sell the gas
legally.36 To survive in the post-war environment, the CWS needed
to prove its usefulness in peacetime. It did this through its
expertise in tear gas.37 After the violent mobs and strikes of 19191921 required federal troops to restore order, the CWS received
inquiries from police departments on the efficacy of tear gas.38
The director of the CWS wrote at the time that he believed tear
gas would prove very useful for dispersing mobs, even though the
CWS had yet to complete the development of a product that
would not cause injury.39
For the CWS, the ability to use tear gas to control civil
disorder presented an opportunity to demonstrate the value of
their tear gas research program, gain a new function of training
law enforcement to use tear gas, and dispel the public’s fear of
31. Jones, supra note 17, at 152. Tear gases were effective in lower concentrations
than toxic gases, so they were more economical in forcing adversaries to keep their gas
masks on and consequently more widely used.
32. Pitchmann, supra note 30, at 1763.
33. Id. It was this backlash that led to the ban of chemical weapons in warfare under
the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925. See infra notes 122-29.
34. Jones, supra note 17, at 159-68.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 158-59.
38. Id. at 152-54.
39. Id.
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and revulsion to gas warfare.40 Accordingly, the CWS campaigned
to police departments across the United States on the utility of
tear gas to control crowds.41 To encourage the adoption of tear
gas, the CWS aided in the establishment of manufacturing firms.42
In fact, most manufacturers of tear gas established between 1920
and 1930 were organized by former CWS officers.43
With this history of the broadening uses of tear gas, private
interests continue to influence its use on civilians
internationally.44 Due to loose regulations, dubious definitions
calling tear gas non-lethal, and the failure of governments to hold
law enforcement or corporate manufacturers accountable for
human rights violations, businesses are able to profit from protest
and social unrest.45 From the early days of tear gas, private
companies have touted the product’s unregulated status,
effectiveness, and so-called harmlessness in advertisements.46 This
supposed harmlessness meant that “tear gas could be applied
without qualms ‘the moment the mob appears and begins to
form.’”47 As recently as 2015, Condor Non-lethal Technologies
(“Condor”), a Brazilian company and world leader in militarized
policing supplies, made claims about the respect for human rights
evinced by their product.48 Condor promises to be a “pioneer in
the dissemination of the ‘Non-lethal’ concept in Brazil . . .
through the controlled use of the escalation of force, without any
harm to human rights.”49 Such a claim is shocking when
40. Id. at 159.
41. Grush, supra note 3.
42. Jones, supra note 17, at 165.
43. Id. at 166. These firms received support from the CWS in the form of supplies
for demonstrations, referrals of requests for tear gas, samples and supplies for
production, and training for law enforcement. Id. at 166-68.
44. See FEIGENBAUM, supra note 1, at 102; see also Global Use of Tear Gas Fuels Police
Abuses, AMNESTY INT’L (June 11, 2020), https://www.amnestyusa.org/pressreleases/toxic-trade-in-tear-gas-fuels-police-abuses/
[https://perma.cc/P2SP-MDT]
(Amnesty International tracked the following manufacturers of tear gas and related
launchers: Cavim, Condor Non-Lethal Technologies, DJI, Falken, PepperBall, the
Safariland Group, and Tippmann Sports LLC).
45. Id.; FEIGENBAUM, supra note 1, at 102.
46. Id. at 108 (noting that one advertisement promoted tear gas by describing it as
“innocuous and efficacious as the family slipper.”).
47. Id. (quoting Theo M. Knappen, War Gases for Dispersing Mobs, 48 GAS AGE REC.
701, 702-03 (1921)).
48. Id. at 104.
49. Id.
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considering the vast number of human rights violations
committed with Condor’s products, including allegedly
systematic torture carried out by security forces in Bahrain and
Egypt.50
B. Contemporary Use of Tear Gas
The use of tear gas on civilians is an international problem
given the prominent use of tear gas in countries all over the
world.51 Proponents of using tear gas against civilians have long
compared its safety claims to the alternative of live ammunition.52
This comparison, however, overlooks both the frequent deaths
caused by law enforcement’s use of tear gas and the availability of
even safer crowd control methods, such as redirecting the flow of
traffic.53 Around the world, people have experienced both lethal
toxic injury and severe traumatic injuries from exploding tear gas
bombs.54 In Waco, Texas in 1993, the US Federal Bureau of
Investigation sprayed tear gas into a large compound housing a
religious sect.55 The compound eventually caught fire, killing
more than seventy-five people who were unable to escape.56 More
recently in the United States, law enforcement officers killed a
belligerent prisoner with pepper spray, a form of tear gas
frequently used by law enforcement.57 In 2011 in Palestine, on
50. See id. at 103-04; see also Egypt: Systematic Failure to Rein in Security Forces, AMNESTY
INT’L (Feb. 12, 2012), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2012/02/egyptsystematic-failure-rein-security-forces/ [https://perma.cc/WKU9-RDLY]; see also
Weaponizing Tear Gas: Bahrain’s Unprecedented Use of Toxic Chemical Agents Against Civilians,
PHYSICIANS
FOR
HUM.
RTS.
7
(2012),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/Bahrain-TearGas-Aug2012-small.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J94M-28GV].
51. Terrence McCoy, Tear Gas is a Chemical Weapon Banned in War. But Ferguson
POST
(Aug.
14,
2014),
Police
Shoot
It
at
Protesters.,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/08/14/tear-gas-is-achemical-weapon-banned-in-war-but-ferguson-police-shoot-it-at-protesters/
[https://perma.cc/Z7DU-2ZRJ].
52. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 17, at 156.
53. See JOHN M. KENNY ET AL., INST. FOR NON-LETHAL DEF. TECH., HUMAN EFFECTS
ADVISORY PANEL REPORT OF FINDINGS, CROWD BEHAVIOR, CROWD CONTROL, AND THE
USE OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 25 (Jan. 1, 2001).
54. McCoy, supra note 51.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Lisa Song, Tear Gas Is Way More Dangerous Than Police Let on — Especially During
(June
4,
2020),
the
Coronavirus
Pandemic,
PROPUBLICA
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three separate occasions, tear gas use caused three deaths: one
from a canister hitting the victim’s head at close range and two
from tear gas inhalation.58 In 2013 in Egypt, thirty-seven people
suffocated to death when law enforcement deployed tear gas in
the back of a vehicle carrying supporters of the ousted President
Morsi to prison.59 Tear gas has caused deaths in Bahrain and
Nepal, and permanent injuries and disabilities in many other
contexts.60
Despite these events, leading Western powers have
continued to tolerate, use, and even promote tear gas, enabling
other countries to use it to suppress protests without facing
significant international scrutiny.61 This orientation is
problematic for many reasons, but particularly because tear gas is
not chemically the same around the world, and while a cloud of
gas might look the same in pictures, there are gradations of
danger and toxicity between different RCAs. For instance, the
levels of toxicity of tear gas manufactured in the Middle East are
generally higher than those used in the United States.62
Researchers have also found Chinese tear gas to be more

https://www.propublica.org/article/tear-gas-is-way-more-dangerous-than-police-let-onespecially-during-the-coronavirus-pandemic [https://perma.cc/D9AS-NDQF]; Craig
Bettenhausen, Tear Gas and Pepper Spray: What Protesters Need to Know, CHEMICAL &
ENGINEERING NEWS (June 18, 2020), https://cen.acs.org/policy/chemicalweapons/Tear-gas-and-pepper-spray-What-protesters-need-to-know/98/web/2020/06
[https://perma.cc/898P-CYDY] (explaining that pepper spray is similar to tear gas in
the effects it causes—though the delivery devices can vary, the primary difference
between the substances is that pepper spray is made from peppers, while tear gas can
refer both to chemical and to natural compounds).
58. McCoy, supra note 51.
59. Id.
60. Rohini J. Haar et al., Health Impacts of Chemical Irritants Used for Crowd Control: A
Systematic Review of the Injuries and Deaths Caused by Tear Gas and Pepper Spray, 17 BCM
HEALTH
1,
8-9
(2017),
PUB.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5649076/pdf/12889_2017_Article_4
814.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZV5-MA6B].
61. FEIGENBAUM, supra note 1, at 109. Amnesty International tracked the abuse of
tear gas in the following countries: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, DRC, Ecuador, France,
Guinea, Hong Kong, Honduras, Haiti, India (Indian-administered Kashmir), Iraq, Iran,
Kenya, Lebanon, Nigeria, Israel-OPT, Sudan, Turkey, the United States, including the
U.S./Mexican border, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. Global Use of Tear Gas Fuels Police Abuses,
supra note 44.
62. McCoy, supra note 51.
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dangerous than tear gas used in the West.63 Even in the United
States, the potency of these agents can vary, with the most potent
pepper spray having forty times the amount of active ingredient
as a weaker pepper spray on the US market.64
Experts say that law enforcement should deploy tear gas
canisters at a short distance and toward the edge of a crowd to
minimize the number of people exposed and to avoid injuries
from impact.65 One instance of tear gas use in the United States
provides a defensible model of the current guidance for the use
of tear gas.66 In June 2020 in Lewisville, Texas, protesters marched
to express discontent about the recent police killings of Black
people in the United States.67 Although the march was planned
in concert with local law enforcement who had arranged for buses
to transport protesters back to their cars, some people returning
from the march on foot left the sidewalk and spilled into a busy
street.68 One intoxicated person was darting among cars and
knocked down a woman and her child, and when law
enforcement officers arrived on the scene, the crowd began to
throw objects at them.69 Officers ordered the crowd to disperse
multiple times, and when they did not, the officers rolled a
canister of tear gas several feet away from the crowd into the
street.70 The crowd scattered but continued to block traffic, so the
officers issued another warning and rolled a second canister of
tear gas toward the crowd.71 According to city officials, only those
who did not leave the street were directedly affected by the tear
gas.72 This instance of tear gas use illustrates the important
elements of circumscribed, non-excessive use of tear gas: with

63. George Colclough, Explainer: Why China-made Tear Gas is More Dangerous, HONG
KONG FREE PRESS (May 1, 2020), https://hongkongfp.com/2020/05/01/explainer-whychina-made-tear-gas-is-more-dangerous/ [https://perma.cc/SH26-N7ZL].
64. MICHAEL CROWLEY, CHEMICAL CONTROL 46 (2016).
65. Lai et al., supra note 5.
66. See After-Action Report: June 2, 2020 Demonstration, CITY LEWISVILLE (June 3,
2020),
https://www.cityoflewisville.com/Home/Components/News/News/5197/710?backlist
=%2f [https://perma.cc/3XVK-UUDC].
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.

1278 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:5

multiple warnings, prompted by violence toward officers
responding to a legitimate objective,73 and affecting only people
who refused to comply.
More common, however, is the inappropriate and dangerous
overuse of tear gas on peaceful protesters.74 This trend has been
apparent around the world.75 The New York Times reported on 100
cities in the United States where protesters were tear gassed over
several weeks in the summer of 2020, ironically, during
demonstrations against police violence.76 That brief period saw
some of the most widespread use of tear gas against protesters in
the United States since the unrest of the late 1960s and early
1970s.77 According to a race and policing expert interviewed for
the report, thousands of people thought they were going to
ordinary, peaceful protests and instead found themselves on the
receiving end of aggressive law enforcement responses,
intensifying anger on both sides.78 Amnesty International tracks
the overuse of tear gas on protesters internationally and provides
an incident map, categorized by types of abuse.79 The types of
abuse they include are: direct fire, excessive quantities,
susceptible
people,
confined
spaces,
and
peaceful
80
demonstrations. These abuses occur on every continent.81
Recently in the United States, many incidents have
demonstrated that law enforcement officers often do not use
tactics consistent with the safest use of tear gas.82 These
inappropriate and dangerous uses of tear gas have resulted in a
serious leg injury, the loss of an eye, and the confinements of
protesters by tear gas deployed from both ends of a street and in

73. The police claimed that traffic was blocked to local hospitals. Id.
74. Lai et al., supra note 5.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. Worse still, the corrosive effects of tear gas may damage lungs and make
people exposed more susceptible to respiratory illnesses such as the coronavirus which
was spreading at that time. Baker, supra note 26.
INT’L,
79. Tear
Gas:
An
Investigation,
AMNESTY
https://teargas.amnesty.org/#incident-map [https://perma.cc/34GY-VGPV] (last
visited Mar. 2, 2021).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Lai et al., supra note 5.
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a sunken expressway, to name a few.83 Some peaceful protesters
have even reported that law enforcement did not warn them prior
to using tear gas.84
Experts suggest that law enforcement officers deploy tear gas
and other riot control agents without knowing their full effects.85
Often, law enforcement officers receive training in how to deploy
these agents directly from the manufacturers, which implies that
the officers could be shown that agents are a primary means of
crowd control, rather than an option for self-defense.86 Also
problematic is that there is little oversight of what police
departments purchase and how they plan to deploy these
chemical agents.87 Without oversight, police departments are at
greater liberty to use RCAs in ill-advised manners.88 Together,
these factors make law enforcement act as though tear gas were a
first-line item to deploy against protesters instead of a last resort.89
1. Common Ways Tear Gas is Abused
Law enforcement use of tear gas against protesters has
attracted much attention and scrutiny.90 This Section outlines the
common ways that law enforcement abuses tear gas: using it
against peaceful demonstrators, in enclosed spaces, in excessive
quantities, by direct fire, against vulnerable populations, and
without regard for environmental impacts.91 With the use of tear
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. See also Jones, supra note 17, at 166.
87. Lai et al., supra note 5.
88. One recent and disturbing incident occurred in Rochester, New York when
police officers handcuffed and pepper sprayed a nine year old girl. The Rochester police
department had already been under scrutiny for placing a hood over the head of a
person in their custody before that person suffocated to death. Both people were Black.
Nicole Hong, Rochester Officers Suspended After Pepper-Spraying of 9-Year-Old Girl, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 31, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/31/nyregion/rochester-policepepper-spray-child.html?referringSource=articleShare [https://perma.cc/WFJ4-AJJU].
89. Lai et al., supra note 5.
90. See, e.g., Tear Gas: An Investigation, supra note 79.
91. Natasha Williams et al., THE PROBLEMATIC LEGALITY OF TEAR GAS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN
RIGHTS
LAW
3-4
(2020),
https://ihrp.law.utoronto.ca/sites/default/files/media/Legality%20of%20Teargas%20
-%20Aug25%20V2.pdf [https://perma.cc/AG6B-PFVS]; see also Jason Wilson, Teargas
used on Portland Protestors Risks ‘Grave Health Hazards,’ Says Lawsuit, GUARDIAN (Oct. 20,
2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/20/teargas-portland-protests-
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gas on the rise in many countries around the world, recent
examples of the abuse of tear gas are abundant.92
Law enforcement use of tear gas against peaceful protesters,
in particular, has attracted significant attention.93 Use of tear gas
against peaceful protesters is problematic because it interferes
with people exercising their right to peaceful assembly, especially
in situations without any threat of violence or injury.94 Such
interference can be seen as law enforcement punishing protesters
and intentionally repressing their rights.95 While its use is routine
in authoritarian countries like Bahrain and Iran,96 law
enforcement in the United States has also come under criticism
for the overuse of tear gas.97
Additionally, use of tear gas in enclosed spaces, for example,
inside of buildings, on dead-end streets, in underground stations,
or where exit routes are otherwise blocked,98 is especially
dangerous because victims have no way of escaping its effects.99
The gas’ effects are exacerbated and can last longer than they
may-pose-grave-health-hazards-lawsuit?CMP=Share_AndroidApp_Other
[https://perma.cc/DE6X-WZVN].
92. Tear Gas: An Investigation, supra note 79.
93. See, e.g., Jessica Moss, Tear Gas and the Politics of Policing, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL. (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/tear-gas-and-politics-protest-policing
[https://perma.cc/3UY4-9ZVD]. Recently law enforcement in the United States
received much criticism for its use of tear gas on protesters, with one particularly
infamous use of tear gas to clear protesters from the path between Lafayette Park and
nearby St. John’s Church in Washington, D.C. for a presidential photo opportunity. See
Lai et al., supra note 5; Katie Rogers, Protesters Dispersed With Tear Gas So Trump Could Pose
TIMES
(June
1,
2020),
at
Church,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/us/politics/trump-st-johns-church-bible.html
[https://perma.cc/PH34-AMB7]; Tom Gjelten, Peaceful Protestors Tear-Gassed to Clear
Way for Trump Church Photo-Op, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 1, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/01/867532070/trumps-unannounced-church-visitangers-church-officials?t=1604067268084 [https://perma.cc/7QA6-AGXR].
94. See Williams et al., supra note 91, at 3.
95. See id.
96. See Moss, supra note 93.
97. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 93; Gjelten, supra note 93.
98. See Justine McDaniel et al., Philadelphia protestors gassed on I-676, leading to
‘pandemonium’ as they tried to flee, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 1, 2020),
https://www.inquirer.com/news/george-floyd-protests-philadelphia-gas-police-vinestreet-expressway-20200601.html [https://perma.cc/RB75-J7P9]; Protesters Return to
Highway Where Tear Gas Was Used in June, ASSOC. PRESS (July 5, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/06a7934091d9542ac4dea445b2a11c84
[https://perma.cc/59CZ-6KT9].
99. See Williams et al., supra note 91, at 3.
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typically do when used in open spaces.100 Even when tear gas is
used in open spaces, it is impossible to control once released
because the gas can drift, resulting in injuries at nearby buildings,
schools, and homes.101 Furthermore, when law enforcement uses
excessive quantities of tear gas, it increases the risk of serious
harm to protesters.102 “Excessive quantities” can mean repeated
exposure over the course of a single event or through a series of
protests, as is common in modern protest movements
internationally.103 Repeated exposure to excessive quantities of
tear gas can further exacerbate severe respiratory problems.104
Additionally, when law enforcement officers fire tear gas at
individuals, they risk serious consequences from tear gas canisters
and other delivery methods striking individuals.105 Canisters are
themselves dangerous projectiles and have caused serious
injury106 and even death.107 Also of great consequence for the use
of tear gas, research dating back to the 1960s shows that the use
of RCAs often backfires, inciting more of the violence it aims to
subdue.108
Using tear gas against vulnerable populations is particularly
dangerous, and practically unavoidable in today’s protest
situations around the world.109 Children, the elderly, people with
preexisting medical conditions, and pregnant women are
100. Id.
101. See James D. Fry, Gas Smells Awful: U.N. Forces, Riot-Control Agents, and the
Chemical Weapons Convention, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 475, 491-92 (2010); Song, supra note
57; 71 Students Treated After Army’s Tear Gas Drifts Into School Yard, ASSOC. PRESS (Feb. 10,
1995) https://apnews.com/article/26eb0db7a1ef4e54859781c1dce03842.
102. Williams et al., supra note 91, at 3.
103. Song, supra note 57.
104. Id.; Williams et al., supra note 91, at 3.
105. Williams et al., supra note 91, at 4.
106. See Jamie Duffy, Indiana Tech Student Loses Eye During Saturday’s Protest, J.
GAZETTE (May 31, 2020), https://www.journalgazette.net/news/local/policefire/20200531/indiana-tech-student-loses-eye-during-saturdays-protest
[https://perma.cc/AV4U-78C4].
107. See, e.g., Iraq: Protestors Killed by Teargas Canisters, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 27,
2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/27/iraq-protesters-killed-teargas-canisters
[https://perma.cc/HWD9-FACE].
108. Ali Pattillo, Tear Gas: Why 1,200 Health Experts Are Urging Experts to Stop Using a
“Horrific Weapon”, INVERSE (June 7, 2021), https://www.inverse.com/mind-body/healthexperts-call-for-a-ban-on-tear-gas [https://perma.cc/9AYM-KCM4] (citing Clark
McPhail et al., Policing Protest in the United States: 1960-1995, in POLICING PROTEST
(Donatella della Porta & Herbert Reiter eds., 1998)).
109. See Baker, supra note 26.
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particularly susceptible to severe effects of tear gas, including
death.110 Tear gas can cause even healthy adults to suffer chemical
burns in the lungs, heart failure, and serious skin conditions, all
of which can be fatal.111 Because protests today include people
from many different demographics, it may not be possible to use
tear gas safely only against populations who are less vulnerable.
Finally, tear gas also poses grave risks of environmental
damage by seeping into nearby homes, contaminating food,
furniture, and surfaces.112 Excessive use can result in substantial
and visible munitions residue and sediment build up on streets
and sidewalks, as well as in stormwater systems which convey the
residue into nearby waterways.113 Advocates call for the use of
chemical weapons to be subject to environmental impact
assessments.114
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING THE USE OF RIOT
CONTROL AGENTS
A. Treaties
Many treaties have taken aim at regulating the use of
chemical weapons, most notably the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (“Chemical
Weapons Convention,” or “CWC”). Early treaties avoided
governing the use of tear gas and other toxic gases against
civilians.115 The CWC outlaws the use of all toxic gases which fit
its definition of “chemical weapons” and the use of tear gas in
armed conflict, but it allows for the use of tear gas by law
enforcement.116 This Section first discusses the precursors to the
CWC, then the CWC itself.

110. Fry, supra note 101, at 538.
111. Id.
112. Song, supra note 57.
113. Wilson, supra note 91.
114. Id.
115. See Giovanello, supra note 8, at 3-5, 11. The greater focus was on the use of
these agents in war. During negotiation of the CWC, negotiators left law enforcement
uses of RCAs out of the coverage of the CWC to ensure greater ratification, including by
the United States. Id. at 11.
116. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 16, art. I, 1, 5; art. II, 1, 7, 9(d).
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1. Precursors to the Chemical Weapons Convention
Efforts to regulate the use of chemical weapons began shortly
after the weapons were invented, even prior to WWI.117 Before
WWI, chemical weapons control focused on limiting or
regulating the use of chemical weapons, rather than full bans on
their use or development.118 Drafters of agreements sought
instead to codify the rules of armed conflict with respect to the
weapons and limit the use of certain tactics and dispersal
devices.119 Pre-WWI agreements include the Saint Petersburg
Declaration of 1868, the Brussels Declaration of 1874, and the
documents produced by the Hague Conferences of 1899 and
1907.120 The Saint Petersburg Declaration, ratified by the major
powers of the time, set a floor for the size of projectiles that could
contain “fulminating or inflammable substances” allowing for the
use of larger scale artillery shells containing the substances.121 The
Brussels Declaration, which was not ratified, stated that weapons
containing poisonous substances were “especially forbidden”
under the rules and laws of war of the time.122 The Hague
Conference of 1899 led to a ban on the use of munitions which
carried poisonous gases, but only in wars between contracting
parties.123 The Hague Conference of 1907 reaffirmed this
principle, but unfortunately these prohibitions did not prevent
states from developing chemical weapons or from using them on
the battlefields of WWI.124
After the devastating use of chemical weapons in WWI,
several international agreements sought to reduce the threat
posed by chemical weapons.125 These agreements include the
Treaty of Versailles, the Washington Naval Treaties of 1921, and

117. See id. at 3.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 3-4.
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and
Customs of War. Brussels, 27 August 1874, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/135?OpenDocument
[https://perma.cc/ZT5W-K2YU] (last visited Dec. 16, 2020)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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the Geneva Protocol of 1925.126 The Treaty of Versailles banned
Germany from developing, possessing, or using chemical
weapons of any kind, although it did not prevent the Allies or
subsequent German regimes from building up their chemical
weapons arsenals before World War II (“WWII”).127 The
Washington Naval Conference focused on limiting naval forces
around the world, especially in the Pacific, and on regulating
submarine warfare and the weaponization of gas.128 The parties
involved agreed that the gas provision would be effective, subject
to unanimous acceptance. French opposition to the antisubmarine provisions, however, prevented the accord.129 The
Geneva Protocol, also known as the Geneva Gas Protocol,
continued the process of limiting and delegitimizing the use of
chemical weapons in war.130 The Protocol, the world’s oldest
multilateral arms control agreement still in effect, banned the
wartime use, but not the possession, of all types of chemical
weapons.131 State parties consider the prohibition limited to
conflicts involving other parties to the Protocol and to the first
use of the weapons, rather than an overall ban on chemical
weapons in warfare.132 The decisions of powerful nations to
refrain from using chemical weapons in WWII, however, appears
to have come from the deterrent effect of opponents possessing
the weapons rather than respect for the Geneva Protocol or
international law.133
2. The Chemical Weapons Convention
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet
Union stockpiled vast quantities of chemical weapons as part of
their strategic arsenals.134 Many other countries, including Israel,

126. Id.
127. Id. (citing Treaty of Versailles art. 171, June 28, 1919, 1919 U.S.T. 7).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 4-5.
130. Id. at 5.
131. Id.
132. Id. The protocol failed to prevent the use of chemical weapons during the
1930s in conflicts between Italy and Ethiopia and between Japan and China. In both
cases, the respective opponents had no chemical weapons to respond in kind to a
chemical weapon attack or deter an attack from taking place. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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India, Sudan, Egypt, North Korea, and Syria, also maintained
chemical weapons arsenals.135 Chemical weapons became a
weapon of mass destruction with a reputation for accessibility, as
they do not require the infrastructure and technology
investments required for developing nuclear weapons.136 The
Cold War saw multilateral efforts on arms control that faced the
challenge of earning the acceptance of both the great powers and
the rest of the international community.137
The Chemical Weapons Convention came out of those
efforts and became the most stringent, intrusive, and demanding
arms control verification measure adopted in a multilateral arms
control treaty.138 It aims to eliminate an entire category of
weapons of mass destruction.139 Under the CWC, state parties
undertake to “never[,] under any circumstances . . . develop,
produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical
weapons, or to transfer chemical weapons to anyone”; to “use
chemical weapons”; to “engage in any military preparations to use
chemical weapons”; and “to assist, encourage or induce, in any
way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party
under this Convention.”140 Additionally, each state party
undertakes to destroy chemical weapons in its territory and any
chemical weapons it abandoned in the territory of another state
party, along with any chemical weapons production facilities
under its control.141 The final general obligation under the CWC
is that each state party undertakes “not to use riot control agents
as a method of warfare.”142
In its general obligations and implementation, the CWC
distinguishes between chemical weapons and riot control agents
(“RCAs”), including tear gas.143 The CWC defines “chemical
weapons” as:

135. JOSEPH CIRINCIONE ET AL., DEADLY ARSENALS: TRACKING WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION 13 (2d ed. 2005).
136. Giovanello, supra note 8, at 5-6.
137. Id. at 6.
138. Id.
139. See Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 16, art. I.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. art. III.
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(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where
intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention,
as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such
purposes;
(b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause
death or other harm through the toxic properties of those
toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (a), which would
be released as a result of the employment of such munitions
and devices;
(c) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in
connection with the employment of munitions and devices
specified in subparagraph (b).144

The CWC defines “riot control agent” as “[a]ny chemical . . .
which can produce rapidly in humans sensory irritation or
disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time
following termination of exposure.”145 As mentioned above, the
use of RCAs as a method of warfare is prohibited, however, the
use of RCAs in civilian life is specifically permitted under the
definition of “Purposes Not Prohibited Under this Convention,”
which allows use for “law enforcement including domestic riot
control purposes.”146
The term “law enforcement purposes” has been subject to
different interpretations of what constitutes “law enforcement.”
The Clinton administration, for instance, interpreted the CWC’s
ban on the use of RCAs to apply only to international or internal
armed conflict, while other peacetime uses of RCAs fall outside
its purview.147 Such peacetime uses of RCAs included normal
peacekeeping operations, law enforcement operations,
humanitarian and disaster relief operations, counter-terrorist and
hostage rescue operations, and noncombatant rescue operations
144. Id. art. II.
145. Id.
146. Id. Other permitted purposes include industrial, agricultural, research,
medical, pharmaceutical, or other peaceful purposes; protective purposes; and military
purposes “not connected with the use of chemical weapons and not dependent on the
use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare.” Id.
147. Giovanello, supra note 8, at 3, 11 (citing William J. Clinton, Message to the Senate
on the Impact of the Chemical Weapons Convention on the Use of Riot Control Agents, AM.
PRESIDENCY
PROJECT
(June
23,
1994),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/message-the-senate-the-impact-thechemical-weapons-convention-the-use-riot-control-agents
[https://perma.cc/5YXZYU5Z]).
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conducted outside armed conflicts.148 Such interpretation is not
limited to the Clinton administration, and, as a result, scholars
have concluded that the term “law enforcement” is overly
vague.149
In interpreting the CWC, modern scholarship overlooks the
term “riot control agent” and does not give it sufficient weight.
While “riot control agent” is the name of a class of chemical
compounds, the name also provides what the agents are meant to
control, namely “riots.” This provision lacks parameters and is
thus subject to abuse by law enforcement officers around the
world. Additionally, the CWC explicitly requires the quantities of
permissible toxic chemicals and their precursors to be consistent
with purposes not prohibited under the convention.150 Typically,
these quantities refer to the possession of chemical weapons for
research purposes, requiring relatively small amounts.151 This
Author, however, finds it would be reasonable to extend the
interpretation of “quantities . . . consistent with such purposes”
to limit law enforcement use of RCAs to what is strictly necessary
for defense and outlaw use for mere convenience, or, worse, for
political suppression.
B. UN Guidance
The United Nations offers soft law guidance152 to law
enforcement in the form of a Code of Conduct for Law
Enforcement Officials (“Code of Conduct”)153 and Guidance on
Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement (“Guidance”).154 The
Code of Conduct dates from 1979 and offers eight articles
controlling the duties and responsibilities of law enforcement

148. Id. at 12. Use of RCAs in such situations has recently received criticism as well.
See Fry, supra note 101, at 477.
149. See generally Fry, supra note 101, at 502-19.
150. What is a Chemical Weapon, OPCW, https://www.opcw.org/our-work/whatchemical-weapon [https://perma.cc/6N4X-T7XP] (last visited Feb. 5, 2021).
151. See id.
152. Soft law is distinguished from “hard law” by its legally non-binding nature.
Unlike hard law, soft law does not create a right of action which can be legally enforced
before a court. Soft law expresses important principles of international law and can
eventually develop into hard law by treaty or customary international law.
153. G.A. Res. 34/169 (Dec. 17, 1979).
154. Office of the United Nations High Comm’r for Human Rights, Guidance on
Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement, U.N. DOC. HR/PUB/20/1 (June 2020).
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officials.155 The Guidance dates from 2020 and offers general
principles on the use of force and accountability, general
considerations pertaining to less-lethal weapons and related
equipment, unlawful weapons, the use of force in specific
situations, and the use of specific less-lethal weapons, as well as
dissemination, review, and implementation of the use of force.156
This Section considers first the articles of the Code of Conduct
relevant to the use of tear gas on protesters, then the relevant
sections of the Guidance.
1. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials
The Code of Conduct emphasizes law enforcement officials’
great responsibility to protect their communities. Article 1 states
officials “shall at all times fulfil the duty imposed upon them by
law, by serving the community and by protecting all persons against
illegal acts, consistent with the high degree of responsibility
required by their profession.”157 This Article places the duties to
serve the community and to protect people from illegal acts on
equal footing. It also emphasizes the high degree of responsibility
that both their profession and their role in their respective
communities require. The mention of illegal acts underlines the
importance of the rule of law in officers’ duties and avoids a
presumption on the legality of officers’ acts. Regarding the
abusive use of tear gas on peaceful protesters, it is hard to see how
such use serves the community or protects people, and how such
use of tear gas is acceptable.
Article 2 of the Code of Conduct calls on law enforcement
explicitly to “respect and protect human dignity and maintain
and uphold the human rights of all persons” in the performance
of their duty.158 The commentary to Article 2 states that human
rights are protected by domestic and international law and lists
the major international instruments protecting human rights
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“UDHR”), the International Covenant on Civil and Political
155. Commentary to Article 1 states, “[l]aw enforcement officials” includes “all
officers of the law, whether appointed or elected, who exercise police powers, especially
the powers of arrest or detention.” G.A. Res. 34/169, supra note 153, art. 1.
156. See generally Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement, supra note 154.
157. G.A. Res. 34/169, supra note 153, art. 1 (emphasis added).
158. G.A. Res. 34/169, supra note 153, art. 2.
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Rights, the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons”).159 The Article emphasizes the duty of
law enforcement to respect and protect human dignity. The use
of tear gas on protesters is in direct contradiction with these
duties in many frequently observed situations.160
Article 3 of the Code of Conduct governs the use of force by
law enforcement, limiting it to situations when “strictly necessary”
and “to the extent required for the performance of their duty.”161
The commentary to Article 3 emphasizes that the use of force by
law enforcement officials should be exceptional.162 Although the
Code of Conduct permits the use of force, such use is limited to
what is “reasonably necessary under the circumstances” for the
prevention of crime or the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected
offenders.163 As applied to the use of tear gas on protesters, the
principles of necessity and proportionality would severely curtail
the sometimes indiscriminate use of tear gas on protesters, many
instances of which harm peaceful protesters as much as their
violent counterparts.164
The final relevant article is Article 5, which states:
[n]o law enforcement official may inflict, instigate or tolerate
any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, nor may any law enforcement
official invoke superior orders or exceptional circumstances

159. This declaration dates from G.A. Res. 3452 (Dec. 9, 1975) which the G.A.
adopted after the Code of Conduct. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment dates from G.A. Res. 39/46 (Dec. 10,
1984) which entered into force June 26, 1987, seven years after the Code of Conduct.
160. See supra Section II.B.
161. G.A. Res. 34/169, supra note 153, art. 3.
162. Id.
163. This limitation brings up the principle of proportionality, which also exists in
the laws of armed conflict or international humanitarian law. Another principle from
the Laws of Armed Conflict which should be considered in the use of tear gas on
protesters is the principle of discrimination. This principle requires that the use of force
must be able to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants, as the use of
force on protesters should be able to discriminate between people behaving violently
and people behaving peacefully.
164. See supra Section II.B.1.

1290 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:5

such as . . . internal political instability or any other public
emergency as a justification.165

Although it may seem severe or alarmist to compare the
overuse of tear gas on protesters to the use of torture or other
inappropriate treatment, a closer inspection of these treatments
reveals that the abuse of tear gas by law enforcement does not
merely parallel what the Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons and later Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“Convention
Against Torture”) explicitly prohibits. In language similar to the
Convention Against Torture, the first article of the Declaration
on the Protection of All Persons defines torture as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering . . . is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as . . . punishing him
for an act he . . . has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him . . . , when such
pain or suffering is inflicted by . . . a public official.166

When tear gas is used against protesters for suppression, as
has frequently been asserted recently,167 it constitutes severe pain
intentionally inflicted for the purpose of intimidation, in direct
violation of the Convention Against Torture and other
international protections of human rights.
2. Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement
The United Nations released the Guidance in 2020, so it is
not yet certain how law enforcement practices will change in
response. An important feature to keep in mind, however, is the
fact that overall, the Guidance remains non-binding soft law.
While it does draw in some instances from binding precedent,
much of what it states regarding the use of tear gas is
recommendation.
The Guidance imports general principles for the use of force
by law enforcement from international humanitarian law. The
Guidance states “any use of force by law enforcement officials
shall comply with the principles of legality, precaution, necessity,

165. G.A. Res. 34/169, supra note 153, art. 5.
166. G.A. Res. 3452, supra note 159, art. I (emphasis added).
167. See generally Moss, supra note 93.

2021]

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONTROL

1291

proportionality, non-discrimination and accountability.”168 Law
enforcement may use force “only if other means appear
ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended
result” (emphasis added).169
The principle of legality requires the use of force to be
regulated by domestic law and regulations to be in accordance
with international law.170 The use of force can be justified only
when used “with the aim of achieving a legitimate law
enforcement objective.”171 Only weapons and weapons systems
authorized by the proper domestic authority may be used in law
enforcement.172 Importantly, the use of force in law enforcement
“shall never be used punitively,”173 a proposition which is
uncertain in today’s climates of repression of dissent around the
globe.
The principle of precaution requires that law enforcement
operations and actions “be planned and conducted while taking
all necessary precautions to prevent . . . the risk of recourse to
force by law enforcement officials and members of the public,
and to minimize the severity of any injury that may be caused”
(emphasis added).174 Law enforcement officials should delay
direct contact with the public if that tactic would reduce the need
for the use of force without endangering the public or officers.175
Adequate training and protective equipment should be provided
to further reduce the need for the use of force.176 Importantly,
law enforcement must give special consideration to people
particularly vulnerable to the use of force and the effects of
specific less-lethal weapons, such as RCAs and rubber bullets.177

168. Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement, supra note 154, at 4.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 5.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. Protective equipment like helmet, shields, stab-resistant gloves and vests
and bullet-resistant vests may decrease the need for law enforcement officials to use
weapons of any kind. Human Rights Council Res. 38/11, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/RES/38/11
¶ 15 (July 6, 2018).
177. Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement, supra note 154, at 6. The
Guidance considers vulnerable people to include children, pregnant women, the elderly,
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In the context of today’s organized protests attended by wide
swaths of the general population, preventing the unnecessary use
of force and giving special consideration to those most vulnerable
to the effects of tear gas takes on added importance.
The principle of necessity requires strict and absolute
necessity of the use of force and that it only be used to the extent
required for the performance of law enforcement officers’
duties.178 This principle requires that no reasonable alternative
appear available at the moment when force is deployed and that
officers seek to de-escalate situations whenever possible.179 The
use of force must be minimized in both degree and duration
relevant to the objective to be achieved.180
The principle of proportionality requires the “type and level
of the force used and the harm that may reasonably be expected
to result from it” be proportionate to “the threat posed by an
individual or group of individuals or to the offence that an
individual or group is committing or is about to commit.”181 The
use of force should never be excessive in relation to the legitimate
objective to be achieved.182 Additionally, law enforcement officers
should consider and minimize at all times the possible incidental
impact of their use of force on bystanders, passers-by, medical
personnel, and journalists.183 Officers must not direct force
against such persons, and any incidental impact must be strictly
proportionate to the legitimate objective to be achieved.184
The principle of non-discrimination requires law
enforcement officials not to discriminate against anyone on the
basis of race, ethnicity, color, sex, sexual orientation, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
disability, property or birth, or other similar criteria.185 The
Guidance requires “a heightened level of care and precaution”
with respect to people who are known or are likely to be
persons with disabilities, person with mental health problems, and persons under the
influence of drugs or alcohol. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 6-7.
182. Id. at 7.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.

2021]

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONTROL

1293

vulnerable to the effects of a particular weapon.186 This
requirement is particularly relevant to the use of tear gas on
protesters, and even more so during the COVID-19 pandemic
when those with respiratory difficulties are at increased risk of
complications from the disease.187
Following the general principles on the use of force, the
Guidance mandates government accountability for the use of
force and provides general considerations pertaining to lesslethal weapons and related equipment. The general
considerations relate to design and production, legal review,
testing and procurement, monitoring, transparency, training,
medical assistance, transfer, and international cooperation and
assistance.188 The Guidance then provides limitations on unlawful
weapons and related equipment and the use of force in specific
situations, such as during arrests and in custodial settings.189
Of the situations the Guidance discusses, the most relevant
to the use of tear gas is public assemblies. The Guidance requires
that fundamental human rights of participants in assemblies be
respected and protected, even if an assembly is considered
unlawful by the authorities.190 Law enforcement officials should
use appropriate de-escalation techniques to minimize the risk of
violence and recall that heavy reliance on even less-lethal
equipment may escalate tensions.191 If there are some violent
individuals, law enforcement officials have a duty to distinguish
between violent and nonviolent participants and to protect the
rights to peaceful assembly of the nonviolent.192 The use of lesslethal weapons to disperse an assembly should be a last resort, so
law enforcement officers should seek to identify and isolate
violent individuals before resorting to less-lethal weapons,
allowing the assembly to continue. When it is not possible to avoid
using less-lethal weapons, officers must provide appropriate
186. Id.
187. See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text. For some people, COVID-19
caused extreme respiratory symptoms sometimes requiring breathing assistance from a
ventilator and resulting in death.
188. See generally Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement, supra note 154,
at 13-19.
189. See id. at 20-23.
190. Id. at 23.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 23-24.
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warning, adequate time to comply, and a safe route to disperse.193
Tear gas should be targeted at only groups of violent individuals,
unless it is lawful under the circumstances to disperse the entire
assembly.194 It is clear from the discussion above that law
enforcement professionals around the globe have historically not
uniformly complied with this point in the Guidance. Due to the
strength of this trend, this Author believes it unlikely that law
enforcement officials will change their practices to comply with
soft law.
The Guidance also provides specific advice for the use of
hand-held chemical irritants, including pepper spray, and for
chemical irritants launched at a distance, including tear gas. The
recommendations relate to the utility and design of the agents
and their delivery methods, the specific risks of the agents, and
circumstances of potentially unlawful use. The use of pepper
spray is potentially lawful when its deployment is accurate and law
enforcement has reason to believe there is an imminent threat of
injury to themselves or others.195 Law enforcement should not use
irritants that contain carcinogenic substances or hazardous levels
of active agents.196 Repeated or prolonged exposure should be
avoided, and chemical irritants should never be used in situations
of exclusively passive resistance.197 Tear gas poses a specific risk of
indiscriminate effects in open areas because of changes in wind
direction.198 Additionally, the Guidance warns, in certain cases
tear gas can be lethal, such as when used in confined spaces or in
high concentrations.199 The Guidance also warns that the
deployment of tear gas behind a group of violent individuals may
prompt the group to move toward law enforcement officials,
thereby increasing the risk of a violent confrontation.200
It remains to be seen whether the Guidance will be successful
in changing engrained law enforcement practices. Although the
United Nations General Assembly adopted the Guidance in 2020,
drafts were circulated in 2019 among experts and were made
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 24.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 30.
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available to the public well before many of the situations of tear
gas overuse referenced earlier in this Note.201 One particular
development from the Code of Conduct to the Guidance is the
prominence of the above-described principles which come from
international humanitarian law, also known as the law of armed
conflict. While on one hand, it makes sense to encourage the
application of principles designed with physical safety in mind to
law enforcement’s use of less-lethal weapons. On the other hand,
the surprising incongruity of contemplating the application of
the rules of armed conflict to policing peaceful protesters should
not go unnoticed. One defense for such application is that the
constraints perhaps are more relevant to the objects themselves
than the role of the people using them, whether combatants or
law enforcement officers. This Author sees it instead as a step
made inevitable by the militarization of police forces,202 yet
questions whether conceiving of officers as one conceives of
combatants does not rather undermine the efficacy of their crowd
control. The armed personnel in war and in law enforcement are
completely and essentially different, despite the fact that their
weapons may have some resemblance. It seems misplaced to allow
the similarities in weapon techniques to overshadow the
enormous differences in the relationships between the armed
and unarmed.
C. European Court of Human Rights Case Law
The European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) is a
regional court grounded in both regional and universal
interpretations of the European Convention on Human Rights
(“Convention”).203 The Convention, although regional, has
universal importance, as is underlined in its preamble’s reference
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.204 The ECtHR has
201. See New Human Rights Guidance on the Use of Less-Lethal Weapons, GENEVA
ACADEMY (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.geneva-academy.ch/news/detail/269-newhuman-rights-guidance-on-the-use-of-less-lethal-weapons
[https://perma.cc/D43YY5FG] (circulating advance unedited version of the U.N. Guidance).
202. See Edward Lawson Jr., TRENDS: Police Militarization and the Use of Lethal Force,
72 POL. RES. Q. 177, 177-89 (2019).
203. Jukka Viljanen, The Role of the European Court of Human Rights as a Developer of
International Human Rights Law, 1 CUADERNOS CONSTITUCIONALES DE LA CÁTEDRA
FABRIQUE 249, 249 (2008).
204. Id.
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been in the avant-garde of human rights law, and its precedent
has been followed by other human rights supervisory organs at
the international level.205 ECtHR case law on the use of tear gas is
informative for the international community and binding for the
European community.206 This Section continues with a discussion
of the ECtHR’s guidance on the use of tear gas on protesters.
A case study of the dispersal of an illegal gathering provides
general principles on the use of force in law enforcement. After
refusing to give permission for a protest in Usukhchay, Russia, law
enforcement officers broke up a peaceful meeting of
demonstrators with tear gas, smoke bombs, and stun grenades.207
The protesters dispersed, and officers followed, beating them
with rubber truncheons and rifle butts. The incident resulted in
one person shot dead, five people severely injured, and several
dozen injured by the shells of the tear gas bombs which had
exploded in the crowd.208 In considering whether there was a
violation of the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of
assembly, the ECtHR recalled that “since States have the right to
require authorization [for demonstrations], they must be able to
apply sanctions to those who participate in demonstrations that
do not comply with the requirement.”209 The question before the
court was how far sanctions may go and whether the dispersal
could be reasonably justified by the original unlawfulness of the
demonstration. Ultimately, it found that an unlawful situation
does not justify an infringement of freedom of assembly.210 The
court emphasized that while rules governing public assemblies,
such as systems of prior notification, are essential for the smooth
conduct of public events, their enforcement cannot become an
end in itself.211

205. Id. at 249-50.
206. Guide on Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Eur. Ct. H.R. 7
(2020).
207. Primov v. Russia, App. No. 17391/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 18 (June 12, 2014).
208. Id.
209. Id. ¶ 118 (citing Ziliberberg v. Moldova, App. No. 61821/00, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(May 4, 2004), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-23889 [https://perma.cc/7JLDFRJA]).
210. Id. (citing Karabulut v. Turkey, App. No. 16999/04 ¶ 35 (July 27, 2009),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-90933 [https://perma.cc/XYR3-883P]).
211. Id.
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A separate ECtHR opinion recognized a continuum of force
for law enforcement.212 The opinion provides that when
confronted with an aggressive demonstration, police action must
be targeted to those demonstrators who act violently, recalling the
principle of discrimination in the law of armed conflict:
Police must only use more dangerous means of response
when less dangerous ones have proved ineffective, following
a scale continuum of force that must be set out in the law and
include verbal commands, use of hands and bodily force,
water cannon, tear gas and other chemical agents, batons or
other impact weapons, dogs, plastic or rubber bullets and
other non-lethal projectiles, and finally deadly force.213

Furthermore, especially dangerous means such as gas
grenades, “must be used in strict accordance with the applicable
technical instructions to avoid unnecessary harm, and in
particular must not be fired ‘directly at humans.’”214
Anna Feigenbaum, a foremost tear gas scholar, has noted
that while the ECtHR tear gas trials bring visibility and
humanitarian weight to tear gas crimes, international law does
not have enforcement mechanisms in place, so these rulings can
represent symbolic successes rather than triumphs of justice.215
Going through high courts is a slow process that can take as long
as ten years to address an instance of misuse, meanwhile struggles
with tear gas continue and are not impacted by rulings against
offending states.216

212. Id. annex b ¶ 13 (Albuquerque, J., concurring and dissenting).
213. Id.
214. Id. A case in which the ECtHR found no violation of the Convention is also
informative, although its subject is the use of a narcotic gas instead of tear gas. The case
resulted from the use of narcotic gas to end a hostage situation which had a high fatality
rate. After terrorists held hostages at a theater in Moscow for three days, Russian security
forces pumped the narcotic gas into the theater through its ventilation system. The
operation resulted in over seven hundred hostages being released, although around one
hundred died during the incident, including from the use of the gas. The court
determined that the use of force was justified and that the use of the gas was not a
disproportionate measure. Finogenov v. Russia, App. Nos. 18299/03 and 27311/03, Eur.
Ct. H.R. ¶ 8-22, 24, 226, 236 (June 4, 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001108231 [https://perma.cc/EZK6-FL2H].
215. See generally FEIGENBAUM, supra note 1, ch. 8.
216. Id.
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IV. SOLUTIONS
Many authorities around the world are advancing the
position that use of tear gas should be banned against protesters,
both domestically and internationally.217 Proponents of this
position criticize the legitimacy of tear gas use in peacetime,
calling to mind the International Court of Justice’s position in
1949 that “elementary considerations of humanity” are “even
more exacting in peace than in war.”218 In contrast, proponents
of the opposing view have taken this reasoning to its opposite end:
tear gas cannot be a combat gas since it is recognized as a weapon
used by law enforcement throughout the world for riot control.219
Jamil Dakwar, the director of the American Civil Liberties
Union Human Rights Project, commented on the reports of tear
gas use on peaceful protesters outside the White House in May
2020:
this appears to be a grossly unjustified use of a dangerous
chemical weapon on protesters and raises serious human
rights concerns under international law. Health experts
warned that the use of tear gas can have long-term effects on
respiratory function. Elected officials, including Congress,
must investigate this politically-motivated and lifethreatening use of indiscriminate weapons.220

Nevertheless, RCAs can be useful and even necessary to
protect law enforcement in certain defensive situations. This Part
discusses solutions to improve the use of RCAs. It recommends
rejecting the distinction between wartime and peacetime use,
improving regulation in the trade and production of RCAs, and
217. See, e.g., Diane Bernabei, It’s Time to Stop the Use of Tear Gas Against Civilians,
JUST SEC. (July 1, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/71062/its-time-to-stop-the-use-oftear-gas-against-civilians/ [https://perma.cc/3B5A-UUAS]. In Portland, Oregon, a
judge placed temporary restrictions on the use of tear gas after it was used to disperse
peaceful protesters. Lawmakers have called for a ban in the use of tear gas in
Massachusetts and New Orleans. The bans on law enforcement using tear gas enacted in
some U.S. cities, including Denver, Seattle, Portland, and Dallas, were only temporary.
See Lai et al., supra note 5.
218. Corfu Channel Case (U.K v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
219. See, e.g., Samuel Longuet, Permitted for Law Enforcement Purposes But Prohibited
in the Conduct of Hostilities: The Case of Riot Control Agents and Expanding Bullets, 98 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS 249 (2016).
220. Press Release, ACLU, Comment on Tear Gas Outside the White House (June
1, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-comment-tear-gas-use-outside-whitehouse [https://perma.cc/5VZW-NR57].
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enacting an optional protocol to the CWC which would provide
for binding limitations on its use as well as public reporting to
improve transparency and compliance.
1. Rejecting the Distinction Between Wartime and Peacetime
Use of RCAs
Samuel Longuet, a scholar at the Fonds National de la
Recherche Scientifique, has argued in the International Review of
the Red Cross that there is no contradiction between the ban on
the use of tear gas in armed conflict and the widespread legal use
by law enforcement.221 Indeed, according to him, the difference
is justified.222 The argument relies on the supposed different
impacts on the human body and lack of risk for escalation in a
peacetime context as opposed to in armed conflict.223 Tear gas
can be lethal in high doses.224 The conditions of armed conflict
can cause the toxic agents in tear gases to accumulate in the body,
either through high doses in enclosed spaces or through repeated
exposure, leading to more incidences of lethal doses.225 Using
tear gas in armed conflict risks escalation to more dangerous
chemical weapons or masking the use thereof.226 Longuet
considers tear gas to be a “threshold weapon” potentially leading
to the use of more toxic chemical weapons and claims the risk of
escalation is even greater when RCAs have caused enemy deaths,
erasing the distinction between non-lethal and lethal chemical
weapons.227
The reasoning underlying the distinction, if it was at one
time applicable, no longer holds true in modern sustained protest
contexts. As modern protest movements have lasted long periods
of time,228 protesters are repeatedly exposed to tear gas, as in
contexts of armed conflict. The same protesters repeatedly
confront the same law enforcement officers,229 risking cumulative
exposure to toxic levels of gas. Additionally, although protesters
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

See Longuet, supra note 217, at 253.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 263.
Id.
See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
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do not have their own chemical weapons with which to escalate
tensions and use against law enforcement officers, protesters have
developed techniques to return fired tear gas behind law
enforcement lines.230 Tensions escalate with violence on both
sides. Ultimately, using tear gas has in fact been shown to risk
escalating violence.231 By rejecting the distinction between armed
conflict and peacetime protests, flaws in policing protests can be
more easily addressed. Recognizing the similarities in situations
of intense tensions on either side of a protest line and those in
armed conflict could make law enforcement more amenable to
the adoption of more successful crowd control practices than the
overuse of RCAs. Finally, regulation on RCA use can focus on the
properties of the agents and devices themselves, thereby
increasing the regulations’ efficacy instead of incentivizing their
evasion by relying on potentially faulty categorization.232
2. Regulation
Scholars have recommended improving regulation of RCAs,
as the agents are currently unregulated.233 Manufacturers provide
training and instructions for tear gas use, but law enforcement
officers typically use much more than what is recommended.234
Additionally, there is a lack of accountability for officers using
tear gas because, unlike bullets and lethal weapons, there is no
230. See Tracy Ma et al., Why Protest Tactics Spread Like Memes, N.Y. TIMES (July 31,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/style/viral-protest-videos.html
[https://perma.cc/FJV8-CDRZ].
231. Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement, supra note 154, at 30.
232. See generally Esther Ness, Moving Beyond Thoughts and Prayers: A New and
Improved Federal Assault Weapons Ban, 44 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1087 (2021).
233. See CROWLEY, supra note 64; Grush, supra note 3; FEIGENBAUM, supra note 1.
NGOs have also called for improved tear gas use practices, among other improvements
in the use of force against protesters. See generally Levy & Wilcken, supra note 9; Statement
by International NGOs on Pro-Democracy Protests on November 17 and 25, 2020, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/node/377141/printable/print
[https://perma.cc/88T6-NL8Q] [hereinafter Pro-Democracy Protests Statements]
(condemning the Thai police’s use of excessive force against protesters; signed by
Amnesty International, Article 19, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, Asia
Democracy Network, Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA),
Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen
Participation, Civil Rights Defenders, FIDH - International Federation for Human
Rights, Fortify Rights, Human Rights Watch, International Commission of Jurists, and
Manushya Foundation).
234. Pro-Democracy Protests Statements, supra note 231.
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way to trace the use of non-lethal weapons back to the individual
officers who deployed them.235
Furthermore, trade in less-lethal munitions does not have
the same kind of tracking procedures as trade in firearms, so they
can be moved between storage facilities with little or no publicly
accessible documentation.236 This lack of regulation allows tear
gas to end up in countries with known humanitarian criticisms of
its overuse while manufacturers and their domestic governments
claim they do not ship their products to such regions and
continue to profit.237 Additionally, expired tear gas, which no
longer meets criteria for safe use yet remains in circulation upon
expiration, is also found at the site of human rights violations.238
With improved tracking and regulation, these problems could be
prevented.
3. Optional Protocol to the CWC
This Note proposes the limitation and regulation of RCAs
through the adoption of an optional protocol to the Chemical
Weapons Convention. The unique suggestion of an optional
protocol consolidates the recommendations of advocates for the
limitation of the use of tear gas on protesters239 and for the
extensive regulation of RCAs.240 It is a pragmatic approach that
builds on an existing framework and would both take advantage
of the strengths of the Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (“OPCW”), namely its chemical weapons
tracking, overseeing, and monitoring capabilities, and expand

235. Id.
236. FEIGENBAUM, supra note 1, at 104.
237. See id. at 103.
238. See id. at 104. Expired tear gas is particularly dangerous for a number of
reasons. Its delivery mechanism can be faulty, leading to greater risk of injury using the
device. The chemical compound may no longer be approved according to safety tests
and certificates. Finally, it can be even more difficult to trace expired gas canisters to
their point of sale. Expired tear gas is meant to be taken out of circulation and destroyed
in compliance with careful environmental protocols.
239. See Levy & Wilcken, supra note 9; Williams et al., supra note 91, at 18.
240. FEIGENBAUM, supra note 1, at 101. Anna Feigenbaum, Riot Control Agents: The
Case for Regulation, 112 SUR FILE ON ARMS AND HUM. RTS. 101 (Dec. 2015),
https://sur.conectas.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/07_SUR22_ENGLISH_ANNA-FEIGENBAUM.pdf [https://perma.cc/CKA8-YK2J].
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the organization’s scope.241 An optional protocol to limit the use
of RCAs would also strengthen the OPCW by broadening its
subject matter jurisdiction and conforming the CWC to human
rights standards by replacing its broad grants of permission to law
enforcement for RCA use with a more limited approach. As an
optional protocol is itself a new treaty, future state parties would
shape the regulation of RCAs and be bound by their consent. The
optional protocol would lend the flexibility necessary to maintain
the strength of the CWC, the strongest international weapons
control agreement in existence, while avoiding the withdrawals
from the CWC which could come with amending the agreement’s
control of RCAs directly.
Additionally, an optional protocol would be stronger than
the UN soft law guidance as it would create binding obligations
on signatories.242 These obligations would also put pressure on
non-signatory states to improve their practices of RCA use on
civilians, to follow in the footsteps of signatory states. This
pressure has been building as a result of advocacy campaigns by
NGOs including Amnesty International243 and Omega Research
Foundation.244 With binding law in place, an optional protocol
could effectively address a problem of international importance.

241. The OPCW has several relevant program aims which include (i) to ensure a
credible and transparent regime for verifying the destruction of chemical weapons and
preventing their re-emergence while protecting legitimate national security and
proprietary interests; (ii) “[t]o provide protection and assistance against chemical
weapons;” and (iii) “to encourage international cooperation in peaceful uses of
chemistry.”
Mission,
OPCW,
https://www.opcw.org/about/mission
[https://perma.cc/67KJ-96XU] (last visited Dec. 29, 2020). The OPCW website provides
that “all toxic chemicals and their precursors, except when used for purposes permitted
by the [CWC] - in quantities consistent with such a purpose,” are chemical weapons. What is
a Chemical Weapon?, OPCW, https://www.opcw.org/work/what-chemical-weapon
[https://perma.cc/RV4X-6S8B] (last visited Dec. 29, 2020) (emphasis added). As
discussed above, the use of RCAs for law enforcement purposes is permitted, however,
the quantities used recently have attracted international attention and merit close
scrutiny for exceeding permissible law enforcement purposes. See Tear Gas: An
Investigation, supra note 79; supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
242. Only current state parties to the CWC could join the optional protocol.
However, the CWC is one of the most widely adopted conventions with 193 state parties.
Conference of the State Parties, OPCW, https://www.opcw.org/about/conference-statesparties [https://perma.cc/GA98-TM46] (last visited Dec. 18, 2020).
243. Tear Gas: An Investigation, supra note 79.
244. Submission to OHCHR on the Use of Less Lethal Weapons During Assemblies, OMEGA
RES. FOUND., https://omegaresearchfoundation.org/publications/submission-ohchr-
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Such an optional protocol may receive few ratifications, as
the use of RCAs by law enforcement is a widespread practice and
has previously been the subject of CWC negotiations.245 However,
as the issues raised by the abuse of RCAs have been in the
spotlight for some time now, public opinion can once again
impact the acceptability of RCAs around the world. One issue that
could preclude a successful ratification is the ubiquity of RCA use.
Many countries rely on the agents in their regular law
enforcement practices. Still, as widespread police violence is
under close scrutiny, law enforcement officials have a strong
incentive to improve their practices overall, including a reduction
in the use of RCAs. With public opinion against the use of RCAs
on peaceful protesters, it is likely that the public would also
support the domestic law that would be needed to bring
international law into force.
a. Features of the Optional Protocol to the CWC
The optional protocol regulating the use of RCAs in law
enforcement should place clear limitations on their use. It should
specify permissible purposes, amounts, types, targets, and require
alternative measures to be sought before RCA use and track
compliance with these limitations. Further, the OPCW should
track the regulation of RCAs to ensure production in line with
international quality standards and distribution in compliance
with the use standards of the optional protocol.246
There should be a provision imposing a duty on law
enforcement officers to exercise reasonable care to ensure no
unnecessary suffering is caused to civilians by the use of RCAs.247
Such a duty would guide limitations on contexts of acceptable
use. For instance, the duty would require RCAs be used only in

use-less-lethal-weapons-during-assemblies [https://perma.cc/XQA6-FVLA] (last visited
Dec. 18, 2020).
245. See Benjamin Kastan, The Chemical Weapons Convention and Riot Control Agents:
Advantages of a “Methods” Approach to Arms Control, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 267, 27172 (2012) (citing Ernest Harper, A Call for a Definition of Method of Warfare in Relation to
the Chemical Weapons Convention, 48 NAVAL L. REV. 132, 136-37 (2001)).
246. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
247. See Fry, supra note 101, at 542; see supra Section III.B.1-2 (discussing the softlaw application of principles of armed conflict to the use of RCAs on civilians).
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defense of life, not property.248 When RCAs are used, no persons
from vulnerable populations should be present or nearby,
including children, the elderly, and pregnant women.249
Although one could pose several hypothetical counterarguments
to this duty of reasonable care, most law enforcement officers
likely adhere to such a duty already.
There should be a provision imposing a duty on law
enforcement officers to minimize the harm RCA use causes.250
Such a duty would require coordination among all law
enforcement personnel responding to a riot.251 Personnel should
never use RCAs from multiple directions, which risks trapping
people trying to avoid the gas and prolonging their exposure.
Further, RCAs should never be used in enclosed spaces. The
lowest possible dosage intensity of RCAs must be the only intensity
used to prevent more severe reactions to the gas. Finally, RCA use
should never occur in combination with other uses of force, such
as physical hitting in baton charges, firing of weapons such as
rubber, plastic or metal bullets, or riding horses or vehicles into
crowds.252
Finally, there should be a duty to take precautions to ensure
a successful protest.253 Precautions include negotiation with
protesters before a protest to consider their goals as well as those
of law enforcement officers.254 That way protesters remain
unharmed and their freedom of movement remains relatively
248. See supra notes 161-63, 178-80 and accompanying text (discussing the
principles of necessity and proportionality). Some domestic laws require this measure
already, however, it has not shown to be enough to prevent problematic use of tear gas.
In order to harden this requirement, international reporting of the use of tear gas would
force law enforcement officers to defend their use of tear gas. See, e.g., Code de la
Sécurité Intérieure [C. de la Séc. Int.] [Internal Security Code] art. L-211-9; (Fr.); Code
Pénal [C. Pén.] [Penal Code] art. 431-3 (Fr.) (permitting the dispersion of crowds by
force, although there is no specific mention of tear gas).
249. See Fry, supra note 101, at 540.
250. See id.
251. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
252. See Alicia A. D’Addario, Policing Protest: Protecting Dissent and Preventing Violence
Through First and Fourth Amendment Law, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 97, 108
(2006).
253. See id. at 98-99, nn.8-12.
254. Negotiated management is advantageous for both demonstrators and police.
Ahead of a successful anti-war protest in New York in 2004, police negotiated with
protesters beforehand and ensured that protesters’ freedom of movement was relatively
unrestricted. The protest ended with a total of only four arrests. Id. at 124.
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unrestricted. As many jurisdictions require a permit for large
protests, part of the permitting process could involve protest
leaders meeting with law enforcement leaders to discuss a plan, a
strategy which was successfully implemented in New York City
ahead of an anti-war protest in 2004.255 Officers should also allow
for minor violations of the law.256 For instance, officers could
choose to ignore instances of graffiti, littering, relatively harmless
objects thrown in their direction, or yelling at officers, and choose
to de-escalate tensions rather than inadvertently triggering or
escalating tensions further. US Department of Justice research
has shown that when police rely on “ineffective and inappropriate
strategies and tactics” they have had the “unintended
consequence of escalating rather than diminishing tensions.”257
By focusing on de-escalation, law enforcement would find less
need to use RCAs at all.258
Placing such limits on law enforcement officers can make it
harder for them to do their jobs, thereby jeopardizing public
safety. However, as mentioned above, law enforcement officers
likely adhere to these duties already. Additionally, with solutions
already existing to improve law enforcement protest policing,
such limitations would likely speed the adoption of better
practices, thereby aiding law enforcement to meet its
responsibilities rather than putting officers and their goals at risk.
Under the optional protocol, state parties would report all
uses of RCAs, as well as their quality, procurement, storage, and
disposal upon expiration. Parties would provide a yearly, publicly
available record of RCA use to the OPCW, specifying aggregate
quantity, frequency of use, type of weapons deployed, and most
importantly, a defense of the circumstances necessitating the use

255. See id. at 99.
256. See id. at 124.
257. Edward R. Maguire, New Directions in Protest Policing, 35 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 67, 67 (2015) (quoting INST. FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, OFFICE OF
COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AFTER-ACTION
ASSESSMENT OF THE POLICE RESPONSE TO THE AUGUST 2014 DEMONSTRATIONS IN
FERGUSON, MISSOURI xiv (2015)).
258. See INST. FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, OFFICE OF COMMUNITY
ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES, U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AFTER-ACTION ASSESSMENT OF
THE POLICE RESPONSE TO THE AUGUST 2014 DEMONSTRATIONS IN FERGUSON, MISSOURI
92 (2015).
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of tear gas.259 Such measures will ensure a uniform and safe
approach. This is particularly important considering the variation
in the intensity of tear gas means that some states use tear gas that
is more dangerous than others.260 As the history of RCA and
chemical weapon use has been largely one of imitation, greater
transparency would likely lead to greater uniformity.261 With
greater uniformity would come greater safety.
V. CONCLUSION
As one advocates for the end of a prominent practice, the
question arises of what should come in its place. The answer exists
already: better, safer law enforcement practices262 to offset the
increasing militarization263 of police forces. How to best scale up
these practices to meet the needs of the international community
would be the next question, and although the OCPW has a strong,
multifaceted capacity building program,264 perhaps a joint
capacity building operation with the International Criminal
Police Organization would better accomplish these goals.265
Above all, we should not forget the principle that impunity for
excessive use of force by the police should never be tolerated, as
the principle is crucial to strengthen or restore the global
population’s trust in law enforcement.266

259. Such reporting has precedent CWC Article III on declarations which requires
state parties to declare to the OPCW no later than 30 days after the CWC enters into
force for that state party information on chemical weapons, old and abandoned chemical
weapons, chemicals weapons production facilities, chemical weapons research and
development facilities or establishments, and RCAs. Chemical Weapons Convention,
supra note 16, art. III.
260. See notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
261. See FEIGENBAUM, supra note 1, at 18.
262. See, e.g., Maguire, supra note 255, at 67-108; Maggie Koerth & Jamiles Lartey,
De-escalation Keeps Protesters and Police Safer. Departments Respond With Force Anyway,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 1, 2020), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/de-escalationkeeps-protesters-and-police-safer-heres-why-departments-respond-with-force-anyway/
[https://perma.cc/JYA8-QXQN].
263. See Lawson, supra note 200, at 178.
264. See Capacity Building, OPCW, https://www.opcw.org/resources/capacitybuilding [https://perma.cc/9PTR-KXMM] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021).
265. See Capacity Building Projects, INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/en/Howwe-work/Capacity-building/Capacity-building-projects
[https://perma.cc/CMT55HSW] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021).
266. See Mijatović, supra note 2.
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This Note advocates for greater regulation of use of tear gas
through an optional protocol to the CWC. Although RCAs can
serve a necessary purpose in law enforcement, their abuse is
currently rampant and unacceptable. The United States and
other states should act in accordance with overwhelming and
growing public opinion, strongly limit the use of RCAs, and cease
using RCAs against protesters. An optional protocol would be the
best manner to accomplish this important goal to create binding
international standards for the use of RCAs, report on the uses of
RCAs to ensure compliance with standards, and to put pressure
on other states to improve their use of RCAs as well.
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